DEVELOPER BETA / LOCAL REVIEW BUILD

A clear boundary.

Lateef gives the MCP client real read/write access to explicitly controlled browser tabs. Pair only with clients you trust. Browser page text is untrusted data; an AI client must not follow instructions embedded in web pages as if they were user instructions.

The broker binds only to `127.0.0.1`, validates the Host header, rejects ordinary web origins, requires a private local admin token for MCP-side RPC, and authenticates extension WebSockets with a profile token. The token is never placed in a URL. Initial extension enrollment requires a single-use 96-bit pairing code with a two-minute expiry. The broker stores the extension token's SHA-256 hash, not the raw value.

The admin token is in the user's private state file, and the extension token is in Chrome extension-local storage. Other programs running as that same OS user may be able to access those secrets; this is not a sandbox against a compromised user account. File modes are best-effort platform permissions, not an encryption layer. Loopback traffic is local HTTP/WebSocket, not TLS.

DOM tools require session ownership and a currently selected window. A guessed tab ID grants no access. User-shared tabs cannot be closed by an agent. The standard extension has no content script, screenshot tool, desktop input, debugger permission, remote analytics, remote control server, provider API, or model invocation. It requests broad HTTP(S) host permissions so it can access agent-created tabs; those permissions are more extensive than a per-site allowlist. A per-site grant UI is a future hardening item.

Full control is a separate build that adds Chrome's debugger permission; the standard extension does not have it. Switched on in its popup, it lets an agent see a controlled tab as an image, send trusted mouse and keyboard input, run JavaScript in the page, and read console messages and request URLs. That is close to everything you could do in that tab. Password fields are still refused for typing, but a script run in the page is not similarly limited. The debugger attaches per controlled tab on first use and detaches when the session ends or the switch goes off.

While an agent controls a tab, the extension adds one marker to the page: a small status chip and a flag, in a closed shadow root outside the page body. It reads nothing from the page and takes no clicks, and it is left out of snapshots and screenshots. A page's own scripts can detect that it exists, so a site can tell Lateef is in use on that tab. A switch in the popup removes it.

Timeouts are ambiguous: an action may have run even if the result was lost. Mutations are never automatically retried. Reconnection does not authorize switching to another paired profile, window, or session.

This is an early prototype. Do not treat initial tests as an audit or a guarantee for sensitive workflows. Report vulnerabilities privately to the repository maintainer once a publication/contact channel is established; do not include pairing codes, tokens, browser data, or authentication cookies in public reports.